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Summary.  The  family of 2-person bargaining  solutions 
called  Lexicographic monotone path solutions -  which 
are  nonsymmetric  generalizations  of  the  lexicographic 
egalitarian  solution  -  is  characterized  in  several ways. 
Central  in  these  characterizations  is  an  interiority con- 
dition  first  introduced  in  [1]  in  order  to  characterize 
the  n-person  lexicographic  egalitarian  solution.  This 
condition  means  that  a  monotonicity  property  is  re- 
quired  to  hold  only  if  the  agreement  is  an  interior 
Pareto  optimal  point,  the  interpretation  being  that 
in that case the agreement is "natural" or "unforced". 
Zusammenfassung.  Die  Klasse von  sogenannten  lexico- 
graphisch  monotonen  Verhandlungsl6sungen  fiir  Ver- 
handlungsprobleme  mit  zwei Spielern wird in mehreren 
Weisen  charakterisiert.  Diese  L6sungen  sind  nicht- 
symmetrische  Verallgemeinerungen  der  lexicographisch 
egalit~iren  Losung.  In  dieser  Charakterisierung  wird 
Monotonie  der L6sung erfordert nur wenn  der L6sungs- 
punkt  nicht  ein  Endpunkt  der Pareto optimalen Menge 
ist.  Diese  Kondition  wird  interpretiert als Nattirlichkeit 
oder  Zwangslosigkeit  der  ~bereinstimmung  zwischen 
den Spielern. 
1.  Introduction 
In  2-person bargaining  problems -  like  division  or  ex- 
change  problems  -  with  comparable  and  properly 
scaled  utilities,  the  egalitarian solution,  which  assigns 
the  maximal  point  of  equal  utilities  as  the  solution 
outcome,  seems  to  be  attractive  but  has  one  serious 
drawback:  for a general class of problems, the egalitarian 
solution  outcome  does not  have  to  be  Pareto optimal. 
As  an  alternative,  the  lexicographic egalitarian solution 
assigns  to  each  problem  the  unique  Pareto  optimal 
point  weakly  dominating  the  egalitarian  solution  out- 
come. 
In this paper, we consider a family of nonsymmetric 
generalizations  called  lexicographic  monotone  path 
solutions.  We will  axiomatically characterize this family 
in  several  ways.  Unfortunately,  these  lexicographic 
monotone  path  solutions  do  not  satisfy  the  (strong) 
monotonicity  axiom  as  used  in  [4]  in  a  characteriza- 
tion  of  the  egalitarian  solution.  Therefore  we  will 
propose  and  use  a  weaker  version  of  this  axiom  in 
which  monotonicity  is  required  to  hold  only  if  the 
solution  outcome  is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal point; 
this  interiority  condition  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
solution outcome being "unforced". 
The  organization  of the  paper is as follows. Section 
2 provides the definitions, in particular the  axioms, and 
an  example  to  motivate  the  mentioned  interiority 
condition.  In  Sect. 3  the  main  results  are  stated  and 
proved.  Section 4  gives  some  discussion  and  indicates 
the relations with existing results. 
2.  Definitions, the Axioms, and an Example 
A  2-person bargaining problem,  or  a  problem,  is  a 
closed  convex  comprehensive I  subset  of  ~2  which 
contains  a  strictly  positive  vector  and  for  which  the 
maximum  in  both  coordinates  exists.  The  points  of a 
problem S  are  called outcomes  and  represent the pairs 
of  utility  levels  of two  players attainable  by coopera- 
tion.  If  cooperation  fails  the  players  end  up  with  0 
l  A  subset  S  of ~2  is  called comprehensive if y  _-< x  implies 
y  ES,  for  ally ~2  and x ES.  (We use <, <,  <, and >_-, ;*, > 
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utility  both;  therefore,  the  origin  is  also  called  the 
disagreement  outcome 2.  Convexity  of  S  may  come 
from  the  use  of  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility 
functions,  comprehensiveness  may  be  interpreted  as 
free  disposibility  of  utility,  and  the  existence  of  a 
strictly  positive  vector  is  a  nondegenerateness  con- 
dition.  The  remaining requirements  on S  are  for mathe- 
matical  convenience.  By  N  we  denote  the  family  of 
all bargaining problems. 
A  2-person  bargaining  solution,  or  a  solution,  is  a 
map  F:s  ~  N2  which  assigns  to  every S E  ~  a  point 
F(S) ES.  The  symbol  "F"  will  also  be used to denote 
a  generic  solution.  Nash  [7] proposed to look for solu- 
tions  satisfying  appealing  axioms,  and  we  adopt  his 
approach  in  this  paper.  In  order  to  define  our  first 
three  axioms,  we  need  some  notation.  For  S E  ~, 
P(S):={xES:for  all  yES,  y>x  I  implies  y=x} 
denotes  the  Pareto  optimal  set  of  S,  and  W(S) := aS 
denotes  the  boundary  or  weakly  Pareto  optimal  set 
of  S.  For  a  subset  T  of  N2,  we  denote  by  conv(T) 
its  convex  hull,  by  com(T):=(yEIR  2  :y_-<x  for 
some x  E  73 its comprehensive hull, and by corny (T) := 
corn (cony (T)) = cony (com (T)) its comprehensive con- 
vex hull. 
Individual rationality (IR): F(S) >= 0 for every S E  ~. 
Pareto optimality (PO): F(S) E P(S) for every S E  N. 
Pareto  continuity  (PC):  For  every  sequence  S,  S 1 , 
S 2 .... Es  with  p(sn)+p(s)  -  where  the  limit  is 
taken  with  respect  to  the  Hausdorff  metric  -  we have 
F(S  n) -+ F(S). 
The first two axioms are fairly standard in bargaining 
game theory  and need  no further comment.  The Pareto 
continuity  axiom  was introduced  in  [10]  and  is strictly 
weaker  than  the  standard  continuity  axiom  (see,  e.g., 
[3];  replace  "P(S  n) ~P(S)"  by  "S  n ~S"  in the  defini- 
tion  above).  One  may  verify  that  the  lexicographic 
monotone  path  solutions,  which  will  be  defined  next, 
do  not  satisfy  the  standard  continuity  axiom,  but  do 
satisfy Pareto continuity. 
Def'mition.  A  monotone  path  is  the  graph  of  a  map 
X'(0,  oo)+N2+  with  Xl(t)+X2(t)  =t  for  every  t>0 
2  More generally,  a problem could be defined as a pair (S, d) 
with disagreement point d ~ S. By fixing the disagreement  point 
at  the  origin,  we implicitly assume  a bargaining solution -  to 
be defined further  on -  to be "'translation invariant", i.e. F(S, 
d) =  d +  F(S, O) 
and  X(s) _>- X(t)  for  all  s >= t >  0.  Note  that such  a map 
X  must  be  continuous.  We  denote  the  monotone  path 
also  by  X.  By A  we  denote  the family of all monotone 
paths. For a  X E A  we define the lexicographicmonotone 
path  solution  zr x  as  follows:  for  S E  s  lrX(S)  is  the 
unique z EP(S) with z >=x for all x  E  X r  W(S). Further, 
we  call  X linear if it is a  (subset of a) straight  line; if X 
is  linear,  then  we  call  ~r x  a  lexicographic  proportional 
solution.  In  particular,  let  o EA  satisfy  al(t ) = o2(t ) 
for every t >  0.7r ~  is called the lexicographic  egalitarian 
solution.  The  egalitarian solution  E  assigns  to  every 
S E  s  the unique  outcome in a  n  W(S). 
It is easy to verify that every lexicographic monotone 
path  solution  satisfies  IR,  PO,  and  PC.  The  egalitarian 
solution  has  all  these  properties  except  for  PO.  The 
now  following  axiom  is used  by  Kalai  [4]  for  charac- 
terizing  the  egalitarian  solution.  It  was  already  discus- 
sed  in  Luce  and  Raiffa  [6],  who  showed  that  it  is  in- 
consistent with Pareto optimality. 
Strong monotonicity (SM):  For all S, T E  ~  with S C  T, 
we have F(S) <= F( T). 
Lexicographic  monotone  path  solutions  violate  the 
strong  monotonicity  axiom.  This  is  not  hard  to  see, 
e.g. see the example below, and also follows immediately 
from the  mentioned  result  in [6]. The underlying reason 
for  this violation  may be explained as follows.  Suppose 
the  players  in  a  problem  reach  an  outcome  which  is 
"forced";  for  instance,  the  "fair"  outcome  is  only 
weakly  Pareto  optimal  but  the  "satiated"  player con- 
sents  to  the  most  nearby  (strongly)  Pareto  optimal 
outcome  since  that  does not hurt him and  is advantage- 
ous  for  his  fellow  player.  Note  that  this  is  the  intui- 
tion  behind  the  lexicographic  monotone  path solutions. 
In  such  a  case,  it  may  be  not  so  reasonable  to except 
or  require  monotonici~y,  because  in  a  larger  problem 
the  latter  player  may  not  be  so  lucky  to  find  his  op- 
ponent quickly satiated. 
Example.  Consider  the  problems S  := com ((2, 4)}  and 
T := comv {(4, 3), (1,6)}.  Note  that  S C  T.  The  only 
Pareto  optimal  point  in  S  is  (2, 4),  which  is  also  the 
lexicographic egalitarian outcome, and weakly dominates 
the  egalitarian  outcome  (2, 2);  at  the  egalitarian  out- 
come  -  which  will be considered  by the players as fair 
if they  believe  in the egalitarian  principle  -  player  1 is 
satiated.  The  egalitarian  and  lexicographic  egalitarian 
outcome  in  T  is the point (7/2,  7/2).  So player 2 loses 
in  T: 7/2 <  4  which  is  the  utility  at  the  lexicographic 
egalitarian outcome (2, 4) in S. 
Another  way  to  look  at  this  same  situation  is  as 
follows.  T can  arise  as the  sum of S  and  V := comv {(2, 
-1), (-1,2)},  i.e.  T =  ((2, 4) + v : v E  V}.  The  problem 
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(we  assume  here  that  utilities  are  additive).  At  the 
lexicographic  egalitarian  outcome  the  additional  re- 
sources  represented  by  V are used to compensate player 
1 for the utility lag suffered in problem S. 
Finally,  it  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  this 
violation  of  monotonicity  does  not  occur  anymore 
if we repeat  the  whole  story with,  say, S = corn ((2, 2)} 
or  S=comv{(3,  1),(1,3)};  in  such  problems  the 
lexicographic  egalitarian  outcome  is  "unforced",  in 
other words the  egalitarian  outcome  is a Pareto optimal 
point. 
The  final  sentence  of  the  above  example  indicates 
a  way  of  formalizing  the  "unforcedness"-idea:  we 
will  require  monotonicity  only  if  the  solution  out- 
come  is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal  point,  where  an 
x  E SE  N  is  called  an  interior  Pareto  optimal  point 
if x  is  in  the  relative  (with  respect  to  a  1-dimensional 
subspace)  interior  of P(S).  In  other  words, x  C P(S) is 
an  interior  point  of P(S)  if  and  only  if  it  is  not  an 
endpoint  of P(S). 
Restricted  monotonicity  with  respect  to  additional 
resources  (RMAR):  For  all  S,  TE Y~  with  S  C  T  and 
F(S)  an  interior  Pareto  optimal  point  of  S,  we  have 
F( T) >= F(S). 
The  RMAR-axiom  was  first  introduced  in  [1]  and 
used  in  a characterization  of the n-person lexicographic 
egalitarian  solution.  In the  same paper an example  sim- 
ilar  to  the  one  above  is  worked  out  in more economic 
detail.  The  above  example  (second  paragraph)  also 
indicates  a  weaker  version  of  the  RMAR-axiom.  For 
S, TC ~2, we denoteS+  T  := {s + t  : sES,  t E  T}. 
Restricted  monotonicity  with  respect  to  additions 
(RMA):  For  all  S,  T E  Z,  if F(S)  is  an  interior  Pareto 
optimal point of S, then F(S + T) >-_ F(S). 
Note  that  RMA  is  implied  by  RMAR.  Note  further 
that  application  of  RMA  presupposes  additivity  of 
utility 3.  A  variation  on  the  RMA-axiom  presents  itself 
naturally: 
Restricted  super-additivity  (RSA):  For  all  S,  TE Z,  if 
F(S)  and F(T)  are  interior  Pareto  optimal  points  of S 
and T, respectively, then F(S + T) >= F(S) + F(T). 
Axioms  related  to  RMA  and  RSA  were  introduced 
in  [8]  and  [10].  In  the  next  section  we  will  present 
several  characterizations  of the  family  of lexicographic 
monotone path solutions. 
3  A  set  of  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  the  ad- 
ditivity of yon Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions is derived 
in [9] 
3.  Characterization Results 
Our first and main theorem is: 
Theorem 1. A  solution F  satisfies Individual rationality, 
Pareto  optimality,  Pareto  continuity,  and  Restricted 
monotonieity  w#h  respect  to  additions,  if and only  if 
it is a lexieographic monotone path solution. 
In  the  proof  of  Theorem 1  we  need  the  following 
lemmas, and some notation:  for every t >  0, let A(t)  := 
comv {(2t, -t), (-t, 2t)} and A  := A(1). 
I.emma 1.  Let  the  solution  F  satisfy  IR,  PO,  PC,  and 
RMA.  Define  X" (0, oo) -+ gt2+ by  X(t) := F(A(t))  for 
every  t >O.  Let  further  ~>0  be  fixed,  and  v, 
w CP(A(a)) with v2 > O, Wl > O, and v2 >_- F2(A(a)) _-> 
w 2 . Then: 
(i)  X~A, 
(ii)  F( A(t)) = 7rx(A(t))for every t > O, 
(iii) F(comv {v, w }) = F(A(a)) = n ~'(A(a)) = zr x (comv  {v, 
w)). 
Proof.  (i)  By  PO  of  F  we  have  Xl(t) + X2(t) -- t  for 
every  t >  0  and  by IR of F  we have moreover X(t) >~ 0 
for every t >  0.  We  still have to show:  if s >  t >  0  then 
F(2x(s)) >1 F(A(t)).  Since  A(s) = 2x(t) + A(s -  t)  and 
F(A(t))  is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal  point  of  A(t), 
the desired conclusion follows from RMA. 
(ii)  Since  F(2x(t))EP(2x(t)),  the  desired  conclusion 
follows from the definition of rr x. 
{iii] The  first  equality  has to be proved.  For notational 
simplicity,  we  take  a=  1,  for  other  values  of  a  the 
proofs  are  analogous.  We  only  consider  the  case 
FI(A ) >  0;  the  remaining  case  F(2x) = (0,  1)  is  similar 
to the case F(2x) = (1,0). 
Let  z  := F(comv (v, w}).  First  suppose  v2 >z2  >  w2. 
Take  e>0  and  let  V(e):=comv{(2+2e-w  1,  -1- 
e-w2),  (- 1 -e-v1,2  + 2e-v2)}  C 2;.  Then  we  have 
comv (v, w} + V(e) = zS(1 + e).  Since  z  is  an  interior 
Pareto  optimal  point  of  corny {v,w},  by  RMA  ap- 
plied  to  comv {v, w},  V(e),  and  A(1 + e),  we  obtain 
F(2x(1  + e)) ~> F(comv {v, w}) = z.  Letting  e  approach 
to 0 we obtain, in view of(ii), F(A) >=z, hence F(Ax) = z. 
Next  suppose  z = v  or  z = w.  By  assuming  that 
z 4=F(A),  we  can  find,  in  view  of IR  and  PC,  points 
r 
',  'EP(A)  with  v2~v2,  w2_-<w2  and  such  that  v  w 
v~ >  F 2 (comv {v', w'}) >  w~, F(comv (v', w'}) r  P(~); 
more  precisely,  we  move  up  from  v and  down  from w 
along P(2x), then by IR the solution point cannot remain 
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F(A).  By  applying  the  first  part  of the  proof in  this 
paragraph  for  comv {v', w'}  and  2x,  we  obtain  a  con- 
tradiction.  [] 
Remark 1.  In l_emma 1, RMA can be replaced by RSA. 
Since  the  proof is similar (we only additionally use the 
facts  that  F(A(s- t))  and  F(V(e))  are  interior  Pareto 
optimal points), it is omitted. 
l.emma 2.  Let  the  solution  F  satisfy  IR,  PO,  PC, and 
RMA,  and  let  X  be  the monotone  path  as defined  in 
Lemma 1.  Then F = 7r x. 
Proof.  For  each x E N2  and  e >  0,  let  v(x, e) := (x 1 -- 
e,x 2 +e)  and  w(x, e):=(x x +e,x 2 -e).  Let SEE  be 
given  and let y  be the minimal point of intersection of 
X and If(S). Choose x E X n  int (S) and 0 <  e <x I +x2 
so  small  that  v(x, e) and  w(x, e) are  interior  points of 
S.  Denote  S(x, e) := comv (v(x, e), w(x, e)}  (E N).  By 
Lemma 1 {iii)  (with  a =x I +x2)  we  have F(S(x, e)) = 
x  = zrX(S(x, e)).  Since  x  is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal 
point  of S(x, e),  by  RMA  we  obtain  F((S-x)+S(x, 
e))>=x=F(S(x,  e)), where S-x  := (y-x  :yES}.  Let- 
ting x  approach to y  and e approach to 0, we may apply 
PC to the limit (S - x) + S(x, e) ~  S and obtain F(S) >= y. 
Since  ~rX(S)EP(S)  and  rrX(S)>=y,  we  conclude  by 
PO that F(S) = zrX(S).  [] 
Proof  of  Theorem 1.  It  is  easy  to  verify  that  every 
lexicographic  monotone  path  solution  satisfies  the 
mentioned axioms. The other part is Lemma 2.  [] 
We  have  noticed  already  that  RMAR is  stronger  than 
RMA.  Noting  furthermore  that  every  lexicographic 
monotone  path  solution  satisfies  RMAR,  we have  the 
following corollary. 
Corollary I.  A  solution  F  satisfies  IR,  PO,  PC,  and 
RMAR,  if and  only  if it is a  lexicographic  monotone 
path solution. 
The  final part  of this  section  is  devoted to  a study of 
the implications of the restricted super-additivity axiom. 
The  next  result  corresponds  to  Lemma 2;  its  proof, 
however, is noted completely analogous. 
1.emma 3.  Let  the  solution  F  satisfy  IR, PO,  PC, and 
RSA,  and  let  X  be  the  monotone  path  as defined in 
Lemma 1.  Then F = zr x. 
Proof.  Let  S E ~.  We  distinguish  two cases:  (a) IrX(S) 
is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal  point,  (b)  rrX(S)  is  an 
endpoint of P(S). 
We  start  with  case  (a).  For  x E N 2  and  e> 0  let 
the  points  v(x, e)  and w(x, e),  and  the  set S(x, e),  be 
defined  as  in  the  proof  of  Lemma2.  Now  take 
xEXC3int(S)  and  0<e<x  I +x2  so small  that  only 
interior  Pareto  optimal  points  of  S  are  dominating 
v(x, e)  or  w(x, e),  and  such  that  v(x, e)  and  w(x, e) 
are interior points of S.  By Lemma 1 (iii) and Remark 1 
we  have  F(S(x,e))=x=zrX(S(x,e)).  Since  F(S-x) 
and  F(S(x, e))  are  interior  Pareto  optimal  points  of 
S-x  and S(x, e)  respectively, by  RSA we have F((S- 
x)  + S(x, e))>=F(S-x)  + F(S(x, e))>=F(S(x, e)).  Let- 
ting x  approach to zrX(S) and e to 0, we conclude by PC 
that F(S) = 7r X(S). 
Next  we  consider case (b). W.l.o.g.  suppose rrX(S) is 
the upper endpoint of P(S).  If F(S) would be the lower 
endpoint of S, then by changing the problem S to some 
S' (e.g. by gradually extendingP(S) downwards) we could 
arrange  F(S'):/=rrX(S ')  with  F(S')  an  interior  Pareto 
optimal  point  of S', in  view  of IR, PO,  and PC; more 
precisely,  by  gradually  extending  P(S)  downwards  we 
will  eventually obtain  a  problem of which the solution 
point  becomes an  interior  Pareto optimal point (by IR 
and PO) unequal  to lrX(S) (by PC). So we suppose now 
that  F(S)  is  an  interior  Pareto  optimal point;  we  will 
derive  a  contradiction  which ends the proof. Let l be a 
supporting  line  of  S  at  F(S).  For  every  e>0  let 
T(e) := com {x + A(e) : x E l, x >_- 0},  and  let  If(e) := 
T(e) -F(S).  Then  mainly because l is a supporting line 
of S  at F(S) we have T(e) =  If(e) + s. In view of IR and 
PO,  we  have  that F(If(e)) is an interior Pareto optimal 
point, so we obtain by RSA: F(T(e)) >= F(If(e)) + F(S), 
so  F(T(e))--F(S)  as  e--'0.  Since  all  nonnegative 
Pareto optimal points of T(e) are interior Pareto optimal 
points,  we  have  in  particular  7rX(T(e))=F(T(e)) by 
case  (a); hence, ~X(T(e)) ~F(S) as e -~ 0.  So F(S) E X, 
contradicting our assumptions.  [] 
The  next  lemma  shows  that  the  implications  of RSA 
combined with the triple  IR-PO-PC, are stronger than 
the  implications  of RMA-IR-PO-PC.  We  call  a  solu- 
tion F  homogeneous  if F(aS) = ode(S)  for every S E I~ 
and  every  positive  real  number a.  Note  that  a  lexico- 
graphic  monotone  path  solution  rr x  is  homogeneous if 
and only if X is linear. 
Lemma 4. Let X E A. Then rr x satisfies  RSA if and only 
if rr x is homogeneou~ 
Proof. The fact that homogeneity of rr x (or, equivalent- 
ly, linearity  of X)  implies  RSA is left for the reader to 
prove. Suppose that rr x satisfies RSA. Then, by applying 
RSA  to  the  case  A(s -  t) + A(t) = A(s)(s >  t >  0),  we 
find  X(s- t)= X(s)-X(t),  so  X must  be  linear  and  7r x 
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We are now in a position to prove. 
Theorem 2. A  solution  satisfies  IR,  PO,  PC, and  RSA, 
if and only if it is a lexicographic proportional solution. 
Proof. Theorem 1, Remark 1, Lemma 3 and 4.  [] 
Thus, Theorem 2 characterizes the lexicographic versions 
of the proportional solutions introduced in [4]. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
We  will make  three  remarks:  the first remark concerns 
possible  strengthenings of Corollary 1 (which we regard 
as  our  main  result);  next  we  comment  on  our  choice 
of domain in particular with respect to Theorem  1 ; and, 
finally, we devote a few words to n-person generalizations. 
Remark 4.  A  generalization of Corollary 1  to  n-person 
problems can  be  found  in  [1]  for  the  symmetric case. 
There,  the  n-person lexicographic egalitarian solution is 
characterized by the axioms PO, (an n-person version of) 
RMAR,  and  a  symmetry  axiom,  namely  Anonymity. 
Note  that  no  explicit  (Pareto)  continuity  axiom  is 
needed;  the  same  holds  for  IR.  Even,  it  is  not  at first 
sight  clear  which  version  of  the  PC-axiom  for  the  n- 
person  case  would  be  satisfied  by  the  lexicographic 
egalitarian  solution.  Related  results  were  obtained  by 
lmai [2] and Lensberg [5]. 
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